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By the time of the candidate-registration deadline for Bolivia's Dec. 6 presidential election, the
political opposition's fate had been sealed. It failed to agree on a consensus platform or on a
common candidate. Its leaders' inordinate personal ambitions and unbridled zeal to be top dog led
to the definitive loss of any possibility of unseating President Evo Morales through the democratic
process.
Morales is the first indigenous president in the South American Andean country's two centuries of
eventful institutional life, which includes 150 coups. Although the first voter-intention polls have
only recently been released, all signs point to Morales' being re-elected to a second four-year term
by a majority that could reach two-thirds of the electorate. In his 2005 election, Morales took 53.7% of
the vote (see NotiSur, 2006-01-06), and, in a recall referendum in 2008, 67% of voters supported him
(see NotiSur, 2008-08-15).
In January of this year, the new Constitution, which Morales had promoted, was approved by 63%
of voters (see NotiSur, 2009-02-13). In addition to choosing a president, legislators, and governors,
residents of rural municipalities will vote in December on whether to adopt a new institutional
structure, a possibility that arose from the January approval of the new indigenist Constitution,
which also changed the name of the legislature from Congreso Nacional to Asamblea Legislativa
Plurinacional. Sixty-three percent of Bolivia's population is indigenous.
In its nine departments, the country has 36 indigenous peoples and 327 municipalities governed by
national laws but which will become, if they so decide in December, "indigenous autonomies." Their
governance will then be based on ancestral practices and customs, which will be written in a specific
statute. However, even if they regain their old communitarian laws, those will be subordinate to the
Constitution, and the indigenous autonomies will not be independent in essential matters of justice,
such as major crimes, treason, or crimes against humanity.

Opposition unable to agree on one platform, candidate
When registration closed on Sept. 7, eight slates of candidates were officially recognized, but the
campaign will be dominated by three the governing Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), headed by
Morales and Vice President Alvaro Garcia Linera; the ultraright, headed by Manfred Reyes Villa,
a former Army captain who served during a de facto government and is accused of crimes against
humanity, and his running mate, former Pando governor Leopoldo Fernandez, jailed for alleged
responsibility in a massacre of campesinos; and the right, led by Samuel Doria Molina, a powerful
cement magnate.
The other five tickets, which together account for less than 10% of voter support, were created
specifically to take votes away from the governing party. They include five indigenous or campesino
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leaders with little community support who at one time backed Morales in the MAS' early days.
The opposition's fragmentation "a real political suicide, fruit of the personal ambitions of a group
of leaders short on greatness," as a columnist for opposition daily La Razon wrote means that the
election will come down to a contest between MAS and a precarious alliance between Reyes Villa
and Fernandez, which at present has the support of less than 11% of voters. Doria Molina, like Reyes
Villa, knows that the most he can hope for is to win a minimal parliamentary representation with
little influence on the country's future.
Morales and Garcia Linera had picked up their ample majority even before the electoral campaign
began. Their popularity is based on their record since taking office in 2005 a program with
strong social and national content that supports a more equitable distribution of wealth and the
nationalization of basic sectors of the economy.
Reyes Villa and Fernandez started at a disadvantage and must overcome a very negative image.
Reyes Villa is a 1976 graduate of the Pentagon's infamous School of the Americas (SOA), now
renamed the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC) and often called
the School of Assassins in Latin America because of the large number of alumni who went on to
become dictators in countries that include Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Panama, and Uruguay.
Reyes Villa was in the intelligence service during the last year of the dictatorship of Gen. Hugo
Banzer (1971-1978) and in 2005 was elected governor of the department of Cochabamba, but he was
later voted out of office in the same 2008 recall referendum in which Morales' tenure was ratified.
Fernandez was governor of Pando until September 2008, when he was jailed along with 77 others
as part of an investigation into the killing of 13 campesinos who were demonstrating in support of
Morales. A mission of the Union de Naciones Sudamericanas (UNASUR) concluded that Fernandez
was responsible for creating and arming the civilian commandos who carried out the killings.

Far right makes major blunders
The opposition had Morales on the ropes during much of 2008. In the five richest departments, all
in the eastern part of the country, an autonomy movement began that included separatist threats,
which led to a government stability and institutionality crisis (see NotiSur, 2008-04-11). But, less than
three months after the recall referendum, the outlook had changed significantly, and a MoralesGarcia Linera victory is now considered a safe bet.
"With a deep feeling of impeding defeat," wrote Pablo Stefanoni, director of the Bolivian edition of
Le Monde Diplomatique, "and in the midst of an acute internecine struggle, the opposition tried
to put together an alliance, or at least two or three fronts, more in an attempt to reduce the damage
than as an effective strategy for fighting for power." But they failed.
How did an opposition that a year ago could afford to declare de facto autonomy, block Morales
from landing at airstrips in the eastern "autonomous" departments, occupy and close government
public offices, and shoot at campesinos arrive at this agonizing state, the columnist asked. The
answer seems simple, say other analysts.
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The right miscalculated the correlation of forces following the recall referendum. What, on the night
of the vote, could naively be interpreted as a stalemate (the tenure of both Morales and the eastern
governors, with the exception of Reyes Villa, had been ratified) could no longer be seen as such a
few hours later following a careful reading of the referendum numbers. In the final vote tally, the
president had not only surpassed the symbolic magic barrier of two-thirds (nationally, he took 67%),
but he had also increased his support in the separatist bastions, winning in two of the five proautonomy departments and reaching 40% in the other three. This is what the opposition did not
understand.
Numerically there was no stalemate and ideologically there was no confrontation, because the
rightists in the eastern departments only knew how to oppose the administration's social and
national platform with violence. Taking over and ransacking public institutions, planting bombs at
electric plants and oil refineries, persecuting and assassinating Morales' followers, closing airports
and blockading police stations.
"Their arrogance caused them to commit irreparable mistakes," wrote the La Razon columnist.
Stefanoni ends his assessment on a somber note. The final straw, he says, was an escapade in which
the ultraright involved the rest of the right and the elite of Santa Cruz de la Sierra (the flagship
separatist department) in hiring Bolivian-Hungarian adventurer Eduardo Rozsa Flores to set up
"resistance commandos" (see NotiSur, 2009-05-08).
Despite the attempt's bizarreness the Le Monde columnist said that Rozsa Flores posted terroristcommando-training photos on his Facebook page the incident served to legitimize government
repression, to confirm the existence of destabilizing and subversive sectors, and, most importantly,
to give the government conclusive evidence for its accusations.
Despite that string of mistakes, the opposition still had a card to play to discredit the December
elections and try to invalidate a sure Morales victory. In those squandered glory days, the opposition
majority in the Senate passed a measure requiring the government to create a new voter-registration
roll biometric, expensive, and difficult to pull off in the four-months allotted in a poor country with
scarce resources.
Although all elections since Morales took office have been monitored by international observers
who certified their transparency, the opposition claimed the voter roll lent itself to a "new fraud."
The government, however, achieved the impossible. The biometric roll, with its photos, its
fingerprints, and its digitalized signatures, had registered almost 100% of eligible voters as of
Sept. 30, two weeks before the completion deadline. The opposition hoped for a fiasco in the
voter-registration process and, with it, an argument to justify efforts to delegitimize the expected
governing-party victory and begin a new terrorist round like that which failed last April, when Rozsa
Flores died in a hail of bullets, left to his fate and surrounded by useless bombs and munitions, in a
confrontation with the police.
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